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Introduction
The interpretation of a sequential (that is, dynamic) choice problem as a planned choice problem is
widely supported by economists and decision theorists. The sequential choice problem is reduced to
a non-sequential choice problem by the adoption of a plan (that is, of a decision strategy) as a tool
to manage time in dynamic decision making. This reduction requires the decision-maker to be
indifferent between choice problems that are strategically equivalent, except for the timing of
resolution of the uncertainty. This means that the decision-maker is required to be indifferent
between early or later resolution of the uncertainty, on the assumption that individual preferences
are timing-independent or timing-invariant.
Recent works (see McClennen,1990; Cubitt, 1996; Cubitt  et al., 1998) have suggested that the
independence axiom of expected utility theory can be interpreted as a combination of principles of
rational dynamic choice. The assumption of timing-independence is explicitly expressed as one of
these principles; and it is endorsed by the theories of dynamic choice
1. However, whether timing-
independence is endorsed by common people is a different matter. Indeed an important question
about this principle is whether individuals in practice are indifferent between strategically
equivalent sequential and planned choice problems. In other words, the question is whether
individual preferences are affected by the timing of the resolution of the uncertainty. The research
reported here concentrates on this particular issue. We present an experiment in which we elicited
subjects’ preferences for three strategically equivalent choice problems, namely a sequential choice
problem, a planned choice problem and a non-sequential choice problem. This experiment allowed
us to investigate whether timing-independence is an appropriate assumption of individual
preferences in practice.
                                                        
1  See, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Machina (1989), Segal (1989, 1990), Karni and Schmeidler (1991). An
important interpretation of dynamic choice behaviour is given by Strotz (1956), McClennen (1990), Karni and Safra
(1989, 1990). They interpret the dynamic choice problem as an intrapersonal choice problem, between the present self
and the future self of the same agent. Before the resolution of any uncertainty, the present self (pre)commits to a course
of action to which the future self has to conform in order to avoid dynamically inconsistent choice behaviour. In this
case, the (pre)commitment of the present self enforces timing-independence, which otherwise would be violated by the
future self.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section I sets up the theoretical background to the experiment.
The design is contained in Section II. Section III reports the experimental results and Section IV
concludes.
I. Theoretical background
In normative decision theory a sequential decision problem is usually reduced to a problem of
planning, that is to a sequence of choices consistent with those specified in the plan adopted at the
initial stage of the decision problem. Hammond (1988a, 1988b) showed that consequentialism is the
axiom, automatically satisfied by expected utility theory, which justifies the reduction of a
sequential choice problem to a planned choice problem.
Given the consequentialist axiom that choice behaviour is explicable by its consequences, a plan
should specify a consistent choice behaviour for every choice node in any pair of strategically
equivalent decision trees representing the decision problem
2. By “strategically equivalent” we mean
that the decision trees imply the same opportunity set of probability distributions of (final)
consequences or, simply, the same set of risky consequences; where each risky consequence
generates from a single plan
3. In other words, the plan should prescribe equivalent choice behaviour
in any pair of equivalent decision trees regardless of their timing of resolution of uncertainty. This
means that agents facing a sequential decision problem are required to adopt a plan prescribing a
sequence of choices corresponding to a feasible set of risky consequences in the equivalent non-
sequential form of the decision problem.
As an illustration consider the decision tree  1 T . Following the usual convention, squares denote
decision nodes and circles denote chance nodes (Raiffa, 1968). The decision problem represented in
1 T  is a  sequential choice problem. Indeed, the chance node is followed by a choice node; and the
                                                        
2 This is the definition of plan given in Hammond (1988a, 1998b). McClennen (1990) and Cubitt (1996) adopt a
different definition of plan, which specifies choices to be made at each choice point that can be reached by
implementation of earlier stages of the adopted plan. As McClennen (1990, p. 282) points out, this definition enforces
dynamic consistency to be an objective rather than an implication of rational behaviour.
3 The plan should reveal a unique choice function. See Hammond (1988a, 1988b) and Cubitt (1996).4
choice problem involves choices taken after the resolution of some of the uncertainty. The elements
of the opportunity set are probability distributions over the consequences  ( ) 3 2 1 , , x x x . The
opportunity set of risky consequences implied by  1 T , and the plans which produce each of them are
listed below:
1 P : ( ) p x p x , ; 1 , 2 3 -
2 P : ( ) pq p x pq x p x - - , ; , ; 1 , 3 1 3
1 P  specifies the choice of the lower branch, and  2 P  the choice of the upper branch. Here, choosing
1 P  gives a (1 -p) chance of receiving  x3, and a  p chance of receiving  x2; while choosing  2 P  gives a
(1 -p) chance of receiving  x3, a  pq chance of receiving  x1, and a ( p-pq) chance of receiving  x3. In a
consequentialist setting, the agent facing the sequential choice problem  is required to choose a
single plan at the root of the decision tree. This situation, represented in  2 T , depicts a  planned
choice problem. The decision tree  2 T  is strategically equivalent to  1 T , but at the  first choice node
the agent is required to adopt either  1 P  or  2 P . This implies that the choice to be made at the second
broken choice node is anticipated before the resolution of the uncertainty. The adoption of a plan




















Hence the situation represented in  1 T  can be alternatively represented as in  3 T .
3 T :
The decision problem represented in  3 T  is a  non-sequential  choice problem. It is strategically
equivalent to  1 T  and  2 T , but it abstracts away from the sequential features of  1 T . In fact, it is the
standard (that is, static) formulation of the sequential choice problem represented in  1 T .
The next section presents an experiment in which we elicited subjects’ preferences for three
strategically equivalent decision problems, as represented in  1 T ,  2 T  and  3 T , by finding out what
they were willing to pay for playing out each of them.
II. The experimental design
The experiment was conducted at  EXEC (the Centre for Experimental Economics at the University
of York). A total of 40 students, both graduate and undergraduate, took part in this computer-based
experiment. Subjects were presented with three triples of decision problems. Each triple consisted
of three strategically equivalent decision problems, namely a sequential choice problem ( 1 T ), a
planned choice problem ( 2 T ), and a non-sequential choice problem ( 3 T ). The plans available in
each triple of decision problems are listed in Table 1. The subjects were asked to state their












- nine decision problems in total. To elicit subject’s preferences we adopted an English Clock
Auction, which is an incentive compatible variant of the classical second-price auction
4.
[Insert table 1 about here]
Each subject sat in front a computer terminal. After the instructions (see Appendix A) were read
out, each subject was given three sheets of paper. On each sheet there was the full description of
each triple of decision problems (see Appendix B). Subjects were given 15 minutes to read carefully
the description of all the decision problems presented. Before starting the experiment proper,
subjects were given a practice triple of decision problems in order to acquire experience with the
incentive compatible nature of the second price auction mechanism, and with the decision
problems. The practice triple presented probability distributions over the monetary outcomes
different from the proper triples. When the auction started, the experimenter announced the first
decision problem ( 1 T ) of Triple 1. The problem was shown on the computer screen. After two
minutes the auction started: at the bottom of the screen was a counter in pounds and pence which
was steadily increasing, starting from a price of zero. Subjects entered their bids by pressing any
key when the counter reached the highest amount they were willing to pay for playing out the
decision problem. The same procedure was followed for all decision problems, which were
auctioned sequentially. No information about the winner of the auction nor the individual bids were
given to the participants at the end of any auction. After all  nine decision problems were auctioned,
one problem was selected at random. For that choice problem, the first and second highest bids
were announced. The subject who had made the highest bid was required to pay the second highest
bid, before playing out for real the decision problem selected. The decision problem selected was
played out following the procedure described in the problem. At the end he or she was given a
                                                        
4 For this type of clock auction, see Harstad (1990). An application is in Di Mauro and Maffioletti (1996).7
participation fee of £5 (English pounds) plus the amount of money eventually gained playing out
the decision problem. All the other participants were given the participation fee of £5.
III. Results
The results of the experiment are summarized in Table 2. The tests involved cross comparisons of
mean WTP values elicited for each decision problem, namely 
2 1, T T WTP WTP and 
3 T WTP .
[Insert table 2 about here]
In order to investigate whether the timing of the resolution of the uncertainty is irrelevant for
individual preferences, we tested the hypothesis that subjects are indifferent between  1 T ,  2 T   and   3 T .
This implies that 
3 2 1 T T T WTP WTP WTP = = . The hypothesis of equality of means in each triple was
tested through the analysis of variance (ANOVA). We carried out also a non-parametric test, that is
a Kruskal-Wallis test. The results of the ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests are shown in Table 3.
[Insert table 3 about here]
ANOVA results from triple 1, triple 2 and triple 3 suggest the rejection of the null hypothesis of
equality of means (with a p value less than 0.001). The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test leads to
the same conclusion. These results suggest that subjects do not consider as equivalent decision
problems which are strategically equivalent. Then we carried out both t-tests and Mann-Whitney
tests to pinpoint which WTP means are different from each other in each triple of decision
problems. The results are shown in table 4.
[Insert table 4 about here]8
The results of these tests suggest the rejection of the null hypothesis that 
2 1 T T WTP WTP =  and
3 2 T T WTP WTP =  in all triples; while they do not suggest the rejection of the null hypothesis that
3 1 T T WTP WTP =  in all triples. This means that subjects do not consider the planned choice problem
as equivalent to both sequential and non-sequential choice problems; while they do consider as
substantially equivalent the sequential choice problem and the non-sequential choice problem.
Evidently, the anticipation of resolution of the uncertainty implied by the planned choice problem
appears to affect subjects’ preferences.
IV. Concluding Remarks
An important principle of rational dynamic choice assumes that individual preferences are timing-
independent. Timing-independence implies that individuals are indifferent between a sequential
choice problem and a planned choice problem, which are strategically equivalent except for the
timing of resolution of the uncertainty. We have designed and carried out a simple experiment to
investigate whether the timing of resolution of the uncertainty affects individual preferences. We
have elicited subject’s preferences for three stategically equivalent choice problems by finding out
what they were willing to pay for playing out each of them. This allowed us to investigate how
subjects respond to early or later resolution of uncertainty.
Our experimental results suggest that timing-independence is an inappropriate assumption of
individual preferences. This result is of particular interest when taken in conjunction with the
experimental results of Cubitt  et al. (1998), which reject the hypothesis that subjects’ choices satisfy
the principle of timing-independence
5. In particular, our findings suggest that subjects are not
                                                        
5 The analogy between our findings and those of Cubitt  et al. (1998) emerges from two crucially different investigations
of timing-independence. In our experiment we test subjects’ preferences for different presentations of the decision
problem; while Cubitt  et al. test whether subjects’ choice behaviour differs depending on the presentation of the
decision problem. It could of course be the case that subjects prefer particular presentations while behaving the same in
all presentations, or that subjects are indifferent between different presentations whilst behaving differently. The two
issues are conceptually quite different.9
indifferent between strategically equivalent choice problems. Indeed, subjects do not consider the
planned choice problem as equivalent to sequential and non-sequential choice problems. This result
is important, for it suggests that the anticipation of resolution of future uncertainty, imposed by
planned decision, may be the reason why decision-makers do not endorse planning as a strategy to
solve sequential choice problems. In this case, the possible explanations may be: that subjects are
not willing to anticipate the future uncertainty for they do not know what their future preferences
will be (see Loewenstein and Adler (1995), Loewenstein (1996)); or that subjects are not willing to
anticipate the future uncertainty for they have a preference for procrastination rather than
anticipation of decisions (e.g. Thaler and Shefrin (1981); Akerlof (1991)). Thus, an implication of
our experimental results points to the opportunity of further investigation of subjects’ preferences
for early or later resolution of the uncertainty, which may be important to explain intertemporal
decisions such as consumption and savings decisions (e.g. Kreps and Porteus (1978, 1979), Epstein
(1980), Machina (1984), Chew and Epstein (1989)). Finally, our findings raise the question of
whether timing-independence may be retained as a normative principle if the timing of resolution of
uncertainty does affect individual preferences.10
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TABLES
Table 1. Plans available in each triple of choice problems
Probability Distribution
Triple 1        (0,.70; 4,.30); (0,.70; 0,.06; 12,.24)
Triple 2        (0,.40; 4,.60); (0,.40; 0,.12; 7,.48)
Triple 3(0,.70; 4,.30); (0,.70; 0,.24; 40,.06)
Table 2. Summary of Results  (all amounts in pounds sterling)
choice problem mean WTP median WTP standard deviation
T 1 4,51 4,55 1,942
Triple 1 T 2 2,42 2,40 1,264
T 3 3,92 3,90 1,823
T 1 3,30 3,245 1,152
Triple 2 T 2 1,93 1,99 7,820
T 3 3,24 3,32 8,232
T 1 7,77 7,89 2,596
Triple 3 T 2 4,06 3,95 1,791
T 3 6,99 7,10 3,05813





) 2 ( c
P-value
Triple 1
3 2 1 T T T WTP WTP WTP = = 8.027 .001 13.213 .001
Triple 2
3 2 1 T T T WTP WTP WTP = = 13.693 .000 22.091 .000
Triple 3
3 2 1 T T T WTP WTP WTP = = 11.849 .000 17.640 .000
Table 4. The results of t-test and Mann-Whitney test
Hypothesis T-statistic P-value U-statistic P-value
2 1 T T WTP WTP = -4.039 .000 75 .001
Triple 1
3 1 T T WTP WTP = .997 .325 161.5 .298
3 2 T T WTP WTP = -3.021 .005 101 .007
2 1 T T WTP WTP = 4.387 .000 52.5 .000
Triple 2
3 1 T T WTP WTP = .178 .859 190 .786
3 2 T T WTP WTP = -5.156 .000 48.5 .000
2 1 T T WTP WTP = -5.251 .000 50.5 .000
Triple 3
3 1 T T WTP WTP = .871 .390 172 .457
3 2 T T WTP WTP = -3.688 .001 87 .00214
Appendix A
Thank you for taking part in this experiment. Please follow these instructions carefully and
remember that during the experiment you are not allowed to talk with anyone nor to look at what
anyone else is doing in the experiment.
You will be presented with three triples of decision problems. Each triple gives three different
presentations of a decision problem.
At the beginning of the experiment the experimenter will distribute three sheets of paper. On each
sheet you will find the full description of each triple of decision problems. You will be given 15
minutes to read carefully the description of all the decision problems presented. Then, you will be
asked to state the maximum amount you are willing to pay for playing out each decision problem of
the triple. You will indicate your willingness to pay through the following auction mechanism.
On the screen you will see a description of the decision problem. Below the description, at the
bottom of the screen, will be shown a counter in pounds and pence which will steadily increase.
You will indicate your willingness to pay by pressing any key when the counter reaches the highest
amount that you are willing to pay. After you have revealed your willingness to pay for all the
decision problems (nine decision problems in total), one of the problem will be selected with a
random device and that problem will be played out for real. The player who states the highest
willingness to pay for that problem will be required to pay the second highest bid, before playing
out the problem selected. She or he will receive a participation fee of £5 (English pounds) plus the
amount of money eventually gained playing out the decision problem. All the other participants will
receive the participation fee.
The experiment is organised as follows:
Step1. You will be given a practice triple of decision problems in order to help you to become
familiar with the auction procedure and with the decision problems. The highest bidder will play out
the decision problem and the payment procedure will be showed.
Step 2. The experimenter will announce the first choice problem of the first triple. You will be
allowed two minutes to think about it.
Step 3. The auction will take place. You will be asked to press a key when the counter reaches the
highest amount that you are willing to pay.
Step 4. After all decision problems have been auctioned, one problem will be selected at random
and played out for real. One of the participants will be asked to pick a number from a bag
containing 9 chips numbered from 1 to 9. Each number corresponds to one of the decision
problems. If, say, number 5 is picked, then the experimenter will enter that number into the the
control computer (please, notice that at the end of the experiment you can check the number of the
chips in the bag). At this point, the screen will show all the prices at which each subject dropped out
from the auction. If you are the highest bidder you will play out the decision problem for real. The
decision problem selected will be played out following the procedure described in the problem. You
will receive the participation fee plus the amount of money eventually gained playing out the




You have a decision problem.
In stage 1 the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:15
if the chip is numbered 1-7 you will receive nothing; if the chip is numbered 8-10 you will reach
stage 2.
If you reach stage 2 you have a choice between:
(a) receiving £4, or (b) the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-8 you will receive £12; if the chip is numbered 9-10 you will receive
nothing.
Problem 2
You have a decision problem.
In stage 1 you have to committ to either (a) or (b), which you will get in the event of reaching stage
2: (a) you will receive £4, or (b) the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-8 you will receive £12; if the chip is numbered 9-10 you will receive
nothing.
After you declare your commitment, the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-7 you will receive nothing; if the chip is numbered 8-10 you will reach
stage 2.
Depending on what you have committed to choose, you will get (a) or (b).
Problem 3
You have a decision problem.
In stage 1 you have to choose either (a) or (b):
(a) the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag: if the chip is numbered 1-7 you will receive
nothing; if the chip is numbered 8-10 you will receive £4.
(b) the controller will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-7 you will receive nothing; if the chip is numbered 8-10 you will reach
stage 2.
If you reach stage 2, the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:




You have a decision problem.
In stage 1 the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-4 you will receive nothing; if the chip is numbered 5-10 you will reach
stage 2.
If you reach stage 2 you have a choice between:
(a) receiving £4, or (b) the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-8 you will receive £7; if the chip is numbered 9-10 you will receive
nothing.
Problem 2
You have a decision problem.
In stage 1 you have to committ to either (a) or (b), which you will get in the event of reaching stage
2: (a) you will receive £4, or (b) the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-8 you will receive £7; if the chip is numbered 9-10 you will receive
nothing.16
After you declare your commitment, the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-4 you will receive nothing; if the chip is numbered 5-10 you will reach
stage 2.
Depending on what you have committed to choose, you will get (a) or (b).
Problem 3
You have a decision problem.
In stage 1 you have to choose either (a) or (b):
(a) the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag: if the chip is numbered 1-4 you will receive
nothing; if the chip is numbered 5-10 you will receive £4.
(b) the controller will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-4 you will receive nothing; if the chip is numbered 5-10 you will reach
stage 2.
If you reach stage 2, the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:




You have a decision problem.
In stage 1 the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-7 you will receive nothing; if the chip is numbered 8-10 you will reach
stage 2.
If you reach stage 2 you have a choice between:
(a) receiving £4, or (b) the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-8 you will receive nothing; if the chip is numbered 9-10 you will receive
£45.
Problem 2
You have a decision problem.
In stage 1 you have to committ to either (a) or (b), which you will get in the event of reaching stage
2: (a) you will receive £4, or (b) the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-8 you will receive nothing; if the chip is numbered 9-10 you will receive
£45.
After you declare your commitment, the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-7 you will receive nothing; if the chip is numbered 8-10 you will reach
stage 2.
Depending on what you have committed to choose, you will get (a) or (b).
Problem 3
You have a decision problem.
In stage 1 you have to choose either (a) or (b):
(a) the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag: if the chip is numbered 1-7 you will receive
nothing; if the chip is numbered 8-10 you will receive £4.
(b) the controller will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-7 you will receive nothing; if the chip is numbered 8-10 you will reach
stage 2.17
If you reach stage 2 the experimenter will draw a chip from the bag:
if the chip is numbered 1-8 you will receive nothing; if the chip is numbered 9-10 you will receive
£45.
(Please, notice that the bag contains 10 chips, and that every time a chip is drawn it will be replaced
in the same bag. At the end of the experiment you can check the number of the chips in the bag)